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The Nothingness of (the) Nothing
Second Part
In recent years, in the analytic philosophical community various people have focused their 
attention again on (the) Nothing, in order to say that, pace Carnap (1932/1959) and pro 
Heidegger (1929/1977), there are occurrences of the corresponding phrase “(the) Nothing” 
in which it works as a singular term, not as a quantified expression (e.g. Casati‐Fujikawa 
2015, 2019, Costantini 2020, Jacquette 2013, 2015, Oliver‐Smiley 2013, Priest 2014a,b, 
Simionato 2017, Voltolini 2015). First of all, I will stress again that, if those occurrences are 
referentially successful, as most of the previous people proposes, they denote an object that 
is paradoxical. For it is inconsistent because of its contradictory behavior with respect to a 
certain universal first‐order property, what I call the genuine existential property, i.e., 
Russell’s (1903) being. After reviewing and assessing such proposals, I will moreover try to 
show why the antecedent of the above conditional is false. In a nutshell, there cannot, even 
impossibly, be such a thing as (the) Nothing, not because this would make the overall totality 
of beings contradictory as well (by both including and not including (the) Nothing), but 
because (as Twardowski 1892/1977 somehow intuited) it would prevent that totality from 
being determined at all and (pace Costantini 2020) once for all. Finally, therefore, the only 
things that there legitimately are à propos of (the) Nothing are significant propositions, 
depending on the fact that the phrase “(the) Nothing” yields a contextually meaningful 
contribution to them qua Russellean definite description, even though it does not denote at 
all. Possibly, this position is similar to what Severino (1957, 2013) maintained on this subject. 
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Introduction 
 
In recent years, against the received view popularized by Carnap 
(1932/1959), various people have proposed that the phrase “(the) Nothing” 
may be used not only as a quantifier expression, but also as a (contextually 
meaningful) singular term (e.g. Casati-Fujikawa, 2015, 2019; Costantini, 
2020; Jacquette, 2013, 2015; Oliver-Smiley, 2013; Priest, 2014a, b; 
Simionato, 2017; Voltolini, 2015)1. Indeed, not all occurrences of such 
phrase can be successfully paraphrased in quantifying terms. To stick to a 
case originally pointed out by Heidegger himself (1984, p. 3), if one truly 
says: 
 
(1) Both Hegel and Heidegger thought about (the) Nothing  
 
one can hardly read it as the false: 
 
(1Q) There is nothing both Hegel and Heidegger thought about 
 
that clearly has a different meaning2. 
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1 In order to dispense with this ambiguity, Oliver-Smiley (2013) coin the new term 
“zilch” and take it as an empty singular term that, if it denoted anything, it would de-
note the Nothing. 
2 For this example, cf. Priest (2014a, p. 150). I take this example to be more convincing 
as other close examples, e.g., “the absence of all beings is (the) Nothing” and “God 
created the World out of (the) Nothing” (Priest 2014a, b). For such examples may be 
open to suitable paraphrases, e.g. “the absence of all beings is the fact that there is 
nothing” and “there is no thing and no time t’ earlier than t out of which God creates 
the World at t”. Since this latter sentence entails, just as the paraphrased one, “God 
created the World at some time”, its value as a paraphrase sounds to me better than 
the one Kroon (2018) proposes and justly reproaches because of the ambiguity be-
tween a monadic and a relational sense of “to create”, i.e., “God created the World 
and there is nothing out of which God created the World”. For further criticisms 
about the ‘reificationist’ reading of the ‘God’ sentence, cf. Sgaravatti-Spolaore (2018). 
I refer to the phrase “(the) Nothing” not only because it is the literal 
translation of the German “das Nichts” used by Carnap’s polemical focus, 
i.e. Heidegger (1929/1977), but also in order not to take stand, for the 
time being, on whether, so used, that phrase counts as a proper name 
(“Nothing”) or as a, possibly nominal, definite description (“the Noth-
ing”). For the majority of such people, in that use the phrase is also refer-
entially successful, in that it denotes an, admittedly zany, item. In this pa-
per, first, I want to assess such proposals in order to see their pros and their 
cons. Second, I want to put forward an argument that purportedly shows 
that one is not ontologically committed to the Nothing in its best meta-
physical account; namely, qua inconsistent paradoxical item. As a result, 
third, I will defend the idea that in the relevant use, “(the) Nothing” is a 
merely contextually meaningful singular term, notably, a Russellean defi-
nite description, which does not denote anything, not even an inconsistent 
paradoxical item. Finally, I will try to see whether my account is similar to 
the one that Severino (1957, 2013) defended. 
The architecture of this paper is the following. In Section 1, I assess the 
ontologically committal positions on the Nothing, while showing why the 
best of such positions make one ontologically commit to an inconsistent 
paradoxical item. In Section 2, I try to show why such a commitment fails. 
In Section 3, I compare my own treatment of “(the) Nothing” as a contex-
tually meaningful yet non-denoting singular term with Severino’s under-
standing of it. 
 
 
1. “(The) Nothing” As a (Contextually Meaningful) Denoting Sin‐
gular Term 
 
Those who think that “(the) Nothing” has a use in which it works as a 
(contextually meaningful) singular term are primarily divided in two main 
camps: those who take that in that use, the phrase denotes an item (e.g. 
Casati-Fujikawa, 2015, 2019; Costantini, 2020; Jacquette, 2013, 2015; 
Priest, 2014a, b; Simionato, 2017) and those who take that in that use, the 
phrase counts as an empty singular term (e.g. Oliver-Smiley, 2013; 
Voltolini, 2015). The first camp further divides into two subgroups: those 
who think that the phrase denotes a consistent entity (Jacquette, 2013, 
2015) and those who think, in the wake of Heidegger, that the phrase de-
notes an inconsistent item (Casati-Fujikawa, 2015, 2019; Priest 2014a, b; 
Simionato, 2017).  
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As Casati-Fujikawa (2019) already underline, the first option is rather 
implausible. In Jacquette’s (2013) account, the Nothing is a Meinongian 
non-existent object that has as its only constitutive property, in Meinong’s 
(1972) and Parsons’ (1980) terms of a property that constitute the object’s 
core, the property of being N. In its turn, being N is spelled out as “being 
nothing other than itself ”, or more extensively, “being the only intendable 
object whose intensional identity involves nothing beyond its self-identi-
ty” (2013, p. 110). Even if one buys the disputable distinction between 
constitutive and extraconstitutive properties, it is unclear to me why the 
above object should be the Nothing. Having nothing but one constitutive 
property, in particular the property of self-identity, does not single out the 
Nothing among other such more plausible candidates of Meinongian non-
existent objects that have just one constitutive property. For example, con-
sider the Meinongian non-existent object that has as its only constitutive 
property the (second-order) property of having no properties3. In my opin-
ion, this object is closer to our intuitive pretheoretical idea of the Nothing. 
For on the one hand, it has the extraconstitutive second-order property of 
having a property: this latter property is the second-order property of hav-
ing no properties it constitutively has. Yet on the other hand, it also fails to 
have that extraconstitutive property. For failing to have that extraconstitu-
tive property accounts for the idea that such an object has no properties, 
since it instead has as a constitutive property, the second-order property of 
having no properties4. 
Clearly enough, the above reflections point out that our intuitive 
pretheoretical idea of the Nothing conceives it as an inconsistent item, 
since the Meinongian object that has the constitutive property of having 
no properties both has and fails to have the extraconstitutive property of 
having a property. This idea is espoused by the other subcamp. Yet one may 
go even further and defend the claim that the Nothing is not only an in-
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3 This object is closer to, but does not coincide with, Parsons’ null object (1980, p. 19), 
i.e., the object that has no constitutive property at all. For this object does have a con-
stitutive property; namely, the (second-order) property of having no property. 
4 As regards intuitions, things would fare no better if being N were equated, as Jacquette 
(2015, p. 211) does, with “the property of not existing and having only whatever ex-
tra-ontic (constitutive) properties are properties of every possibly intended (existent 
or nonexistent) object of thought”. For further problems with this proposal, cf. 
Casati-Fujikawa (2019, pp. 3743-5). 
consistent object, like, say, the round square and the wooden cannon made 
of steel (this example comes from Twardowski 1892/1977), but also a 
paradoxical object, since it both possesses and fail to possess a universal 
first-order property; namely, a property that all entities in the overall on-
tological domain have. So, for Priest, the Nothing is, in a Heideggerian 
vein, both something, i.e., an object, and fails to be so (2014a), or analo-
gously, is both self-identical and fails to be so (2014b). Both being some-
thing and being self-identical are universal first-order properties5. 
The first account – being something and not being such – seems to me 
worse than the second – being self-identical and not being such. For hold-
ing that the Nothing is something depends on an intentionality thesis (IT: 
Jacquette, 2015) that, pace Priest, has in itself a mere phenomenological 
and not an ontological import. According to IT, as it seems to any subject, 
any thought is about an intentional object (intentionale), i.e., for any 
thought there is an intentionale, independently of whether it exists6. Now 
by itself, this phenomenological thesis does not ontologically commit one 
to intentionalia. For in itself, an intentionale is just a schematic object; 
namely, something that, qua object of thought, has no metaphysical na-
ture (Crane, 2001, 2013). If it has such a nature, an intentionale has it only 
independently of its being thought (ib.). As a result, in order for one to be 
ontologically committed to an intentionale, one must be independently 
committed to the objects that have the same metaphysical nature as that 
intentionale has outside phenomenology (Voltolini, 2013)7. For example, 
one may think about Graham Priest. Qua object of thought, Priest is an 
intentionale just as any other. Yet independently of its being thought of, 
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5 It is precisely because the Nothing is such, or, in analogous formulation, is both iden-
tical with something and fails to be so, that Oliver-Smiley (2013) and Voltolini 
(2015) respectively take “(the) Nothing” to have no denotation. More on this later. 
6 Priest would rebut that for him, the somethingness of the Nothing only depends from 
particularly generalizing from sentences like (1) (personal communication). Yet it 
seems to me that such a particular generalization and IT stand together. If it is only 
phenomenologically the case that for any thought there is an intentionale, indepen-
dently of whether it exists, then it is also only phenomenologically the case that there 
is something – i.e., (the) Nothing – both Hegel and Heidegger thought about, and 
vice versa. 
7 For Crane (2001, 2013), these are just all existent intentionalia. Yet he admits not also 
that, however spelled out in first-order terms, existence is not a metaphysically relevant 
property, but also that nonexistent intentionalia have different metaphysical natures. 
Priest is metaphysically a concretum; namely, an object that may have 
causal powers (for this definition of concreteness, cf. Cocchiarella, 1982 and 
Priest himself, 2016). Now, one is ontologically committed to concreta. 
Hence, one is ontologically committed to Priest as well.  Now, apply this 
reasoning to the Nothing. Phenomenologically speaking, one may well 
think of the Nothing. This is what (1) above testifies. Yet in itself, this does 
not mean that the Nothing is something; namely, something that is al-
lowed in the overall ontological domain. For in order for it to be so allowed, 
one must prove that one is ontologically committed to an item that has the 
paradoxical nature that both is and is not something. But this must be in-
dependently proved. 
Granted, Priest may reply by saying that being a paradoxical object in 
the above sense – being something and failing to be so – does not qualify 
the metaphysical nature of the Nothing. For its nature instead consists in 
its being the absence of all beings (see also Simionato, 2017), what was 
there before that God created the World. Moreover, this nature may be 
further spelled out in mereological terms. As he (2014a, b) says, the Noth-
ing is the fusion of no thing, the sum that has nothing as its parts. 
First of all, I wonder whether conceiving the Nothing as a mereological 
sum satisfies our intuitive conception of it. For it is unclear to me whether 
when we pretheoretically think of the Nothing, we take it to be an entity 
of such a kind8. More problematically, moreover, a sum of no parts is hard 
to swallow. For a mereological sum is an entity whose being, in some way 
or other, depends on its parts: in order for a sum to be, its parts (whether 
existent or not)9 must be as well. Yet if there are no parts, it is unclear how 
their sum can be there as well.  
Priest might respond by saying that this is not particularly problematic. 
For one is also ontologically committed to the empty set, i.e., the set that 
has no members, although it cannot be there as well, since a set also de-
pends on its members.   
Yet at most this response shows that the Nothing is nothing, but then 
again, one must show what makes it the case that the Nothing is also some-
thing, since the above thesis IT does not prove it.  
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8 Similar doubts arise towards Casati-Fujikawa’s (2019) idea of the Nothing as the com-
plement of the totality of all beings. This idea raises a further problem, as we will see 
later. 
9 For this specification, cf. Casati-Fujikawa (2019). 
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Perhaps a better move is to say that there is no real distinction between 
the first and the second account. For we are just looking for a universal 
first-order property that the Nothing simultaneously has and fails to have, 
and all the above descriptions – being something, being an object, being 
self-identical, being identical with something – are just conceptually differ-
ent characterizations of one and the same universal first-order property. 
However one conceives it10, this is the property that, perhaps trivially, all 
members of the overall ontological domain possess: what originally Russell 
(1903) labeled being11, in order to distinguish it from existence, i.e., a prop-
erty that only some entities in that ontological domain possess (Voltolini 
2018). Let me call this universal first-order property the genuine existential 
property. 
But if this is the case, namely, if the Nothing simultaneously has and 
fails to have that very universal first-order property, then a further problem 
arises. As we will see in the next Section, this problem prevents “(the) 
Nothing” from being a successfully referential term, even from being a 
term that refers to an inconsistent paradoxical item. 
 
 
2. The Totality Problem 
 
Let me start from the fact that possessing a property (or satisfying a pred-
icate, if one wants to put thing in nominalist terms) is the condition for 
fixing the extension of a set. Trivially, for example, the set of Italians is the 
set of the all and only individuals that are Italian. Thus, this condition also 
works for adequately restricting the scope of a quantifier. In order to truly 
saying e.g.: 
 
(2) Everyone gesticulates 
 
one must restrict the scope of the universal quantifier to the set of the 
Italians. Yet this condition not only works for domain restriction, but also 
for domain determination. The set of absolutely all entities yields the over-
all ontological domain, the totality of all beings, whose extension is given 
188
10 A further characterization is Williamson’s (2002) existence in a logical sense. 
11 Pace Priest (2014a, p. 150), who erroneously conflates being with subsistence, i.e., the 
non-universal property of non-spatiotemporal existence. 
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by the possession of the universal first-order property I talked about at the 
end of the previous Section, the genuine existential property12. 
Suppose, however, that there were an item that simultaneously pos-
sessed and failed to possess this property. If this were the case, it would be 
impossible to determine the totality of all beings, the overall ontological 
domain. For the property in question would simultaneously be both uni-
versal (for it includes the Nothing among its possessors) and non-universal 
(for it fails to include it). 
First, this problem is stronger than the problem that a certain domain 
of entities is simultaneously both the overall ontological domain (for the 
Nothing belongs to it) and fails to be such (for the Nothing does not be-
long to it), or in other terms, that it both is and is not the totality of all be-
ings13. For this would simply show that such a domain has a contradictory 
feature. But here the problem is that such a domain cannot even be deter-
mined. Rather than a contradictory domain, there cannot even be such a 
domain at all. 
Second, this problem arises only with respect to the special totality of 
all beings that is the overall ontological domain. For in itself, as regards an 
ordinary totality, there is no problem as regards the fact that the relevant 
condition fixing it is both satisfied and not satisfied by a certain entity. For 
that totality is subordinated to a larger totality that includes both its mem-
bers and the members of its complement. Thus, it may well be the case 
that, by both satisfying and not satisfying that condition, an entity both 
belongs to that totality and does not belong to it, i.e., belongs to its com-
plement. For it does belong to that superordinate larger totality. For exam-
ple, the ordinal of all ordinals may both be and fail to be an ordinal, there-
by belonging both to the set of ordinals and not belonging to it, thereby 
also belonging to its complement14. For the totality of ordinals is subordi-
nated to the larger totality of numbers, to which the ordinal of all ordinals 
anyway belongs. Yet once one focuses on the totality of all beings, there is 
by definition no larger totality to which this totality is subordinated, so 
189
12 The overall ontological domain is absolutely narrower or larger, depending on 
whether the genuine existential property is equated or not with a substantial existen-
tial property. Cf. Voltolini, 2018. 
13 Cf. Casati-Fujikawa, 2019, p. 3758. 
14 I owe this example to Graham Priest. Of course, more mundane examples may be 
conceived: transsexuals both are and are not women, insofar as they are all human be-
ings. 
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that an item may both belong to this totality and fail to belong to it, i.e., 
belong also to its complement, thereby belonging to that larger totality15. 
In this vein, the problem refers to the problem Twardowski 
(1892/1977, pp. 19-20) raised. In order for the complement of a set to be 
successfully conceived, one must have a superordinate concept under 
which both the members of that set and the members of that set’s comple-
ment fall. For example, Greeks (i.e., individuals falling under the concept 
of being Greek) and non-Greeks (i.e., individuals falling under the oppo-
site concept of being non-Greek) are both human beings (i.e., individuals 
falling under the superordinate concept of being a human being). Yet one 
cannot have a superordinate concept under which both the somethings, 
i.e., the inhabitants of the overall ontological domain of beings, the total-
ity of all beings, and the non-somethings fall. For that concept would be 
both superordinate to the somethings and coordinated with it, something 
again. Hence, the overall ontological domain could not be determined. 
At this point, one may think that the determination problem I raised 
may be circumvented by postulating an indefinite plurality of totalities of 
all beings, each of which is larger than the previous one insofar as it in-
cludes the Nothing the previous totality excluded, yet it excludes a further 
fine-grained Nothing, so that in the end one comes up with an indefinite 
series of Nothings as well (Costantini, 2020). 
The solution is ingenious, for it simultaneously removes the weaker 
problem of ascribing to the overall ontological domain a contradictory fea-
ture and the stronger problem of that very domain being unable to be de-
termined. For at each step of the procedure, we have a Nothing that is not 
a something of a certain domain, yet it is a something of a larger domain 
that has another more fine-grained Nothing out of it. Yet another problem 
arises; namely, we fail to have properties that are able to respectively deter-
mine the progressive domains. The first alleged totality is provisionally the 
totality of all beings. But so is the second alleged larger totality, and so on 
ad infinitum. Yet, how can one select all such totalities? Indeed, how can 
the first universal first-order property be distinct from the second similar 
property if not in an ad hoc manner – to be the property of being except all 
190
15 As a result, the Nothing cannot be satisfactorily conceived even as the impossible 
complement of the totality of all beings, as Casati-Fujikawa (2019) maintain. For 
since that totality cannot be determined, also the impossible complement of that to-
tality cannot be determined. 
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Nothings vs. to be the property of being except all minus one Nothing, and 
so on? 
In the end, therefore, it seems that it is better not to have at one’s dis-
posal an inconsistent paradoxical object (or an indefinite list of them), but 
to dispense with it at all. Or in other words, it is better to take “(the) Noth-
ing” in its use as a singular term to be a non-denoting expression. As I said, 




3. “(The) Nothing” As a Merely Contextually Meaningful Singular 
Term 
 
In defending the idea that “(the) Nothing” counts as an empty singular 
term, one may take it either as an empty genuine singular term or as a de-
notationless merely apparent singular term that is explained away by the 
appropriate paraphrase of the sentence in which it occurs, qua definite de-
scription à la Russell. Since when one utters sentences like (1) above one 
is under the impression that one has uttered something meaningful, the 
first strategy is notoriously hard. For it is hard to provide a convincing ac-
count according to which the above sentence is meaningful if genuine sin-
gular terms are expressions that exhaust their meaning in their referents, 
i.e., in the entities they stand for, as Millian sustainers of direct reference 
theories traditionally hold. If a genuine singular term is empty and having 
meaning for that term is exhausted by its having a certain referent, it is 
hard to see how can it be meaningful16. 
Granted, there are notorious ways in which sustainers of direct refer-
ence theories may circumvent this problem, by suitably weakening their 
adherence to Millianism17. Yet since a simpler alternative is at one’s dispos-
191
16 The main proposals in the direct reference camp have notorious problems. Metalin-
guistic accounts à la Donnellan (1974) or fictionalist accounts à la Walton (1990) 
and Everett (2013) hardly give convincing truthconditional accounts of sentences like 
(1). ‘Gappist’ accounts à la Braun (1993) or presuppositionalist accounts à la Sains-
bury (2009) fail to provide a convincing account of the truthconditional difference 
between (1) and the intuitively true “Both Hegel and Heidegger thought about Santa 
Claus” or between (1) and the intuitively false “Both Hegel and Heidegger thought 
about Harry Potter”. For more on this, cf. Kroon-Voltolini, 2018. 
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al, i.e., to take “(the) Nothing” as a Russellean denotationless definite de-
scription, thereby removing the brackets that in it surround the definite ar-
ticle, better to stick to it. Voltolini (2015) proposes that sentences contain-
ing the phrase “(the) Nothing” in its use as a singular term, i.e., sentences 
of the form “(the) Nothing is F”, must be read as sentences containing the 
definite description “the thing that is identical with nothing”, or more ex-
plicitly “the thing that is such that it is not the case that something is iden-
tical with it”,18 so as to count as sentences of the kind “the thing that is 
identical with nothing Fs”. This description is moreover to be understood 
à la Russell, by being contextually defined as Russell recommends, i.e. by 
suitably paraphrasing the sentences containing it in terms of sentences 
merely containing quantifying and predicative expressions, e.g., sentences 
of the kind “there is only one thing that is identical with nothing, and this 
thing Fs”. Now, since the sentence in question is such that the existence 
condition it states is unsatisfied, for as I said in the previous Section there 
is no inconsistent paradoxical object that is both identical with nothing 
and fails to be such, that sentence is meaningful but typically false. No-
table exceptions are sentences like (1), which are both meaningful and 
true. For there the description takes narrow scope, thereby failing to claim 
any ontological commitment to any item whatsoever. So read, (1) indeed 
amounts to the true: 
 
(1R) Both Hegel and Heidegger thought that there is only one thing that 
is identical with nothing19. 
192
17 One way of doing this is by splitting the overall meaningfulness of an empty singular 
term from its direct truthconditional contribution, e.g. by taking proper names as a 
sort of indexicals, having a linguistic meaning over and above their contextual refer-
ence. Cf. Voltolini, 2014. 
18 Likewise, Oliver-Smiley say that “zilch” must be defined “via description – the thing 
that is nothing, the non-existent thing, the thing that is F and not F; they are all log-
ically equivalent” (2013, p. 602). 
19 For a similar treatment, see Sgaravatti-Spolaore (2018, p. 133fn.1). This true para-
phrase strengthens the idea I defended before that (1) is one of the best examples in 
which “(the) Nothing” is used as a singular term. Incidentally, note that I does not 
propose this kind of de dicto reading for any sentence of the same grammatical form 
as (1), but only for those sentences of that form whose phenomenological content 
does not match their real content, since one is not ontologically committed to the in-
tentionalia they involve (see Section 1). Priest (2021) would certainly reply that this 
account does not explain the fact that other sentences involving “(the) Nothing” are 
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Now, it is quite possible that this account aligns with that originally 
provided by Severino (1957/2021, 2013/2021). According to Severino: 
 
(3) The meaning ‘nothing’ is a self-contradictory meaning, which is to 
say a contradiction (1957/2021, p. 35). 
 
In (3), the subject term expresses a self-contradictory meaning – I take 
that this amounts to what Severino calls the first moment of the Nothing 
(2013/2021, p. 35), aka “the positive meaningfulness” of the Nothing. In 
turn, what the predicate predicates of that meaning is what testifies to the 
nothingness of the Nothing, since there is no such thing; namely, the ele-
ment of self-contradictoriness – I take that this amounts to what Severino 
calls the second moment of the Nothing (ib.), aka “the absolute nothing-
ness and meaninglessness” of the Nothing. As a result, (3) states a certain 
propositional contradiction, which as such well figures in the overall on-
tological domain – it states that a certain contradiction is, in Severino’s 
own terms (ibid.)20. As stating a proposition about a meaning, (3) provides 
the true counterpart of what would be false if it were expressed not in se-
mantical but in purportedly ontological terms, by taking the Nothing as 
what is other than being (ib, p. 33): 
 
(4) What is other than being, i.e., the being that is other than being, is 
self-contradictory. 
 
(4) contains a definite description “the being that is other than being” 
very similar to Voltolini’s (2015) original description, “the thing that is 
identical with nothing”. Moreover, it is meaningful in its predicating the 
193
true, yet that are such that the description cannot be given narrow scope, such as e.g. 
“(the) Nothing is (the) Nothing”. Dead right, for this is a consequence of the Russel-
lean account of denotationless definite descriptions. To be sure, if one wanted to give 
to “(the) Nothing is (the) Nothing” a true reading, one should read the relevant pred-
icate “being identical with nothing” as involving an internal, not an external, predi-
cation of the property it expresses, along the lines of Castañeda (1989). But then the 
description would denote a Meinongian object that is a correlate of the set whose only 
member is that property. Cf. Voltolini, 2006. Yet this object would no longer be the 
inconsistent paradoxical object a defender of the Nothing looks for. 
20 Unlike other propositions, this propositional contradiction necessarily subsists. As 
Severino puts thusly: “it is the meaning nothing which is a contradiction – a necessary 
contradiction” (2013/2021, p. 36). 
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self-contradictoriness of the thing that simultaneously is both a being and 
not a being. Yet since the description is denotationless for there is no such 
a thing, (4) is false. Just as the Heideggerian: 
 
(5) The Nothing nothings 
 
is in Voltolini’s (2015) reconstruction. 
Note however that, on behalf of Severino’s himself, this semantical in-
terpretation of Severino’s position takes what he says à propos of meaning 
in non-Severinian terms. For it takes the meaning (3) talks about as the se-
mantic content of the expression “nothing” in it, not as what “the meaning 
‘nothing’” stands for in it, as Severino instead does in a sort of directly ref-
erential mood à la early Russell (1903). For if this were the case, then in 
(3) “the meaning ‘nothing’” would refer to a sui generis item, say the ab-
sence of any significance, in order to predicate of this very item its being 
self-contradictory, for the absence of any significance is anyway significant. 
But this would amount to take that item as an object that is not an object, 
precisely as the sort of paradoxical impossible object that Priest (and Hei-
degger himself before him) is looking for. Doubtlessly, this result would 





Let me sum up. It is correct to say that there is a use in which the phrase 
“(the) Nothing” works as a contextually meaningful singular term rather 
than as a quantifying expression. Yet in that use that phrase counts as a de-
notationless Russellean definite description. For it cannot denote what it 
would plausibly denote if it could denote anything; namely, a paradoxical 
object, i.e., an item that is inconsistent since it would simultaneously have 
and fail to have the universal first-order property, i.e., the genuine existen-
tial property of being. Possibly, in holding that the only thing that there is 
à propos of the Nothing is a certain contradictory meaning of the corre-
sponding linguistic expression, Severino would have agreed with these 
claims21. 
194
21 I am very much to indebted to Franz Berto, Fred Kroon, Federico Perelda, Matteo 
Plebani and Graham Priest for their comments on this paper and the nice discussions 
had with them on this subject.
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